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JUDGMENT AGAINST A NON-BREACHING SELLER:
THE COST OF OUTRUNNING THE LAW TO DO JUSTICE UNDER
SECTION 2-608 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
A

CRITICAL REREADING OF TROUTMAN V. PIERCE
GARY L. MONSERUD*

I.

INTRODUCTION
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code offers buyers who

receive non-conforming goods an array of remedial options.'

For

example, disappointed buyers can rid themselves of non-conforming
goods by using the "goods-oriented remedies" of rejection and
revocation of acceptance. 2 These goods-oriented remedies provide an
aggrieved buyer two opportunities for relief. First, an aggrieved buyer,
before acceptance, can reject non-conforming goods. 3 Subject to the
seller's right to cure the non-conformity, the aggrieved buyer can obtain
a refund of the purchase price, or any part thereof. 4 Alternatively, after
acceptance, an aggrieved buyer can revoke acceptance if the nonconformity substantially impairs the value of the goods to the revoking
buyer and the procedural requisites of section 2-608 have been met. 5
Like the buyer who makes a rightful rejection, a buyer who rightfully
revokes acceptance is entitled to refund of the purchase price, or any
part thereof.6 Thus, both rejection and revocation of acceptance,
* Professor of Law. New England School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts; J.D. 1976, University
of South Dakota School of Law; LL.M. 1985, New York University School of Law. As author of this
article, I want to gratefully acknowledge the help I received from Mr. Fred Rathert, of Bjella, Neff,
Rathert, Wahl & Eiken, Williston, North Dakota, in gathering background material. Mr. Rathert
allowed me to borrow his file, including the transcript of the trial and the record on appeal. This file is
the basis for much of this article. I am also indebted to the trial counsel to whom I have spoken. Mr.
William McKechnie, Grand Forks, North Dakota (formerly in the same firm as Mr. Rathert) was
counsel for the plaintiffs. Mr. Jon Brakke, Fargo, North Dakota. was counsel for Pierce, Inc. Mr.
Don Peterson, Minot, North Dakota, was counsel for Schult Home Corporation. I benefitted greatly
from discussing the case with each of them. Mr. David Walker. Valley City, North Dakota, helped me
very much by sharing his recollections of Erling v. Homera, Inc., 298 N.W.2d 478 (N.D. 1980). Their
free and easy style and willingness to talk were much appreciated.
1. See U.C.C. § 2-711 (1989) (providing a catalogue of buyer's remedies).
2. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-3 (3d ed. 1988).
White and Summers use the phrase "goods-oriented remedies" to describe rejection (§ 2-601) and
revocation of acceptance (§ 2-608). Id. § 8-3. 8-4.
3. See U.C.C. § 2-601 (1989) (embodying the so-called perfect tender rule). See U.C.C. § 2-606
(1989) (outlining the ways in which a buyer makes an acceptance).
4. See U.C.C. § 2-711(1) (1989). The aggrieved buyer may employ other remedies as well. See
U.C.C. § 2-712 (1989) (outlining the buyer's right to "cover" or procure substitute goods); U.C.C. §
2-713 (1989) (providing for buyer's damages for nondelivery): U.C.C. § 2-508 (1989) (outlining a
seller's right to cure).
5. See U.C.C. § 2-608(2) (1989). A buyer must revoke acceptance within a reasonable time and
before any substantial change in the condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects.
Id. The buyer must give notice to the seller within a reasonable time. Revocation is not effective until
the seller receives notice of it. Id.
6. U.C.C. § 2-711(l) (1989). The aggrieved buyer may be entitled to other remedies as well.
See supra note 4 (outlining buyer's remedies).
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operating in conjunction with section 2-711(1), provide for a forced
exchange: the non-conforming goods are exchanged for the purchase
7
price.
Consider a hypothetical situation to illustrate revocation of
acceptance after the time for rejection has passed. Suppose Eric buys a
new snowmobile in December, paying full price to the dealer on the date
of delivery. 8 From the date of delivery through February, the snowmobile works well. For lack of a timely rejection, we can assume Eric
has legally "accepted" the snowmobile. 9 Suppose that in March, the
clutch starts malfunctioning and the drive belt shows excessive wear. An
experienced mechanic examines the snowmobile and concludes that the
clutch was defective on manufacture, and that the drive belt wear is
excessive due to the clutch malfunction. Unless Eric bargained away his
rights at the time of purchase,10 he may still be able to get rid of the
snowmobile in return for the full purchase price, if he can meet the
requirements for revocation of acceptance under section 2-608 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. 11 Those requirements are: (1) a nonconformity which substantially impairs the value of the goods to him, (2)
an acceptance (i) (with discovery of the defect) on the reasonable
assumption that the non-conformity would be cured or (ii) (without
discovery) reasonably induced by the difficulty of discovery or seller's
assurances, (3) revocation within a reasonable time, (4) revocation before
a substantial change in the snowmobile not caused by its own defects,

7. U.C.C. § 2-711(1) (1989). Of course, other remedies may be sought in the same action. See
supra note 4 (outlining buyer's remedies).
8. The hypothetical is based on the facts of Gochey v. Bombardier. Inc.. 572 A.2d 921 (Vt.
1990).
9. U.C.C. § 2-606(l)(b) (1989). "Acceptance' occurs simply by lapse of time when the buyer
fails to make an effective rejection. id.
10. Sellers may limit remedies thereby precluding revocation of acceptance and refund, for
example. by "repair or replacement" clauses under section 2-719(l)(a) of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Of course, such a limitation may fail its essential purpose thereby clearing the way for Code
remedies. See U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1989).
11. Section 2-608 of the Uniform Commercial Code states:
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose
non-conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would be cured; or
(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was reasonably induced
either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assurances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer
discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change
in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is not effective
until the buyer notifies the seller of it.
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods
involved as if he had rejected them.
U.C.C. § 2-608 (1989).
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and (5) due notice of revocation to the seller.12 The reasonable time for
notice of revocation is generally longer than the reasonable'time within
which notice of rejection must be given.13 Consequently, revocation of
acceptance is a buyer's second chance to get rid of goods which fail to
conform to the terms of the contract for sale.
If the number of reported cases is an index of popularity,
revocation of acceptance cases were not especially popular in the early
days of the Code as judges granted revocation of acceptance and refund
infrequently.14 In recent years, however, hundreds of decisions arising
under section 2-608 have been reported. 15 As courts have widened the
outer limits of the "reasonable time" within which notice of revocation
must be given,1 6 revocation of acceptance has become an increasingly
valuable remedial device for aggrieved buyers. Nonetheless, a stumbling
block to its effective use has arisen: namely, a defendant's often
successful employment of the doctrine of privity as a bar to revocation
of acceptance. 17
Defendants have been successful in raising privity as a bar to
revocation of acceptance because of ambiguities in the text of section
2-608 and related sections. 18 The ambiguities concern the meaning of
the term "seller" which appears in sections 2-608 and 2-711(1) and is
defined in section 2-103(1)(d).
The term "seller" against whom
revocation of acceptance can be invoked could be restricted to
immediate seller, i.e. a seller in contractual privity, or it could include
remote seller, i.e. a seller upstream in the distribution chain and not in
contractual privity with the buyer who seeks to employ revocation of
acceptance.1 9 Cases wherein privity has been raised have presented the

12. WHITE & SUMMERS. supra note 2, § 8-4.
13. U.C.C. § 2-608. cmt. 4 (1989).
14. "[Diuring the early years of the Code the courts did not take to it." WHITE & SUMMERS. supra
note 2, § 8-4. The early years of the Code were the late 1950's and early 1960's. Pennsylvania
enacted the Code in 1953. Id. § 1. After many changes in the Official Text, Massachusetts in 1957
became the second state to enact the Code. Id. In 1962, four states adopted the Code; in 1963, I1
adopted the Code; in 1964 one; in 1965, 13; so that, by 1968 the Code was effective in 49 states. Id.
15. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL C ODE D IOEST 1 2608 (1993) (providing synopses of cases under
U.C.C. § 2-608 on pages 345-608).
16. See St-Laurent v. Fiermonti Oldsmobile, Inc., 611 A.2d 638 (N.H. 1992) (finding notice
within 19 months reasonable in the case of a car with a latent defect).
17. E.g. Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 374 A.2d 144 (Conn. 1976) (refusing to allow a
buyer to revoke acceptance against the remote seller, Ford Motor Company, for lack of privity).
18. I have said "ambiguities" in the plural because the possible double meaning of "seller" creates
different possibilities under both section 2-608, which allows revocation of acceptance, and section
2-711(1), which allows refund.
19. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1199 (6th ed. 1990). "Privily of contract. That connection or
relationship which exists between two or more contracting parties. It was traditionally essential to the
maintenance of an action on any contract that there should subsist such privity between the plaintiff
and the defendant in respect of the matter sued on." Id. In a typical car purchase, the customer is in
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vexing question: Can revocation of acceptance be used against any
person who breaches an express or implied warranty running to the
aggrieved buyer, or is its use limited to actions against a seller in
contractual privity? Thus, the perennially puzzling privity problem has
made it appearance in the midst of Article 2's remedial scheme.
The courts have split 20 as have the-commentators. 21 The majority of
courts presented with the question have limited the use of revocation of
acceptance to a seller in privity with the complaining buyer. 22 However,
a significant minority have held that revocation of acceptance is available

privity with the dealer, and the dealer is in privity with the manufacturer, but there is no privity
(immediate connection) between the customer and the manufacturer.
20. In at least 12 reported cases, courts have held or stated in dicta that revocation and
acceptance and refund can only be employed against a seller in contractual privity. Voytovich v.
Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 494 F.2d 1208, 1211 (6th Cir. 1974) (applying Ohio law); Seekings v.
Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 638 P.2d 210, 214 (Ariz. 1981); Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.,
374 A.2d 144, 149-50 (Conn. 1976): Volvo of Am. Corp. v. Wells, 551 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Ky. Ct. App.
1977); Henderson v. Chrysler Corp., 477 N.W.2d 505, 507 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Alberti v.
Manufactured Homes, Inc., 381 S.E.2d 478, 480 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989), affd in part, rev'd in part,
vacated in part, 407 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. 1991); Wright v. O'Neal Motors, Inc., 291 S.E.2d 165, 169 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1982); Cooper v. Mason, 188 S.E.2d 653, 655 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972); Edelstein v. Toyota Motor
Distrib, 422 A.2d 101, 104 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980); Noice v. Paul's Marine & Camping Ctr.,
Inc., 451 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982); Fund v. Montgomery AMC/Jeep/Renault, 586 N.E.2d
1113, 1116-17 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co., Inc., 313 S.E.2d 384,390 (Va.
1984); Reece v. Yeager Ford Sales, Inc., 184 S.E.2d 727, 731 (W. Va. 1971); Crume v. Ford Motor
Co.. 653 P.2d 564, 566 (Or. Ct. App. 1982). See also Andover Air Ltd. Partnership v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1494, 1500 (D. Mass. 1989) (assuming that the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court would follow the majority); Ayanru v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 495 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1023 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1985) (finding revocation effective only
between buyer and person who sells or contracts to sell goods); Hart Honey Co. v. Cudworth, 446
N.W.2d 742, 744 (N.D. 1989) (defining the term "seller" with reference to WHITE & SUMMERS § 8-4
(3d ed. 1988) thus aligning itself with the majority).
Several courts have rejected the majority view represented by the foregoing cases and have
allowed revocation and refund without privity between buyer and the defendant-seller. Ford Motor
Credit Co., v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117, 1126 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Arkansas law); Durfee v. Rod
Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 357 (Minn. 1978); Volkswagen of Am., Inc., v. Novak, 418 So.
2d 801, 804 (Miss. 1982); Royal Lincoln-Mercury Sales, Inc. v. Wallace, 415 So. 2d 1024, 1029 (Miss.
1982); Ventura v. Ford Motor Corp., 433 A.2d 801, 811 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981); Gochey v.
Bombardier, Inc., 572 A.2d 921, 923 (Vt. 1990); see Smith v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 714 F. Supp.
303, 309 (N.D. I11.
1989); (applying the "close connection" doctrine of Christianson v. Venturi Const.
Co., 440 N.E. 2d 226, to allow buyer to bring action against financing company for seller's breach
under financing instrument); Erling v. Homera, Inc., 298 N.W.2d 478, 479 (N.D. 1980) (sustaining a
judgment which allowed revocation of acceptance and held both the immediate seller and remote
seller (manufacturer) liable for return of the purchase price). See infra note 23, for more on the
Erlingcase.
21. E.g.,Professors White and Summers support the majority viewpoint requiring privity for
revocation of acceptance and refund. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 8-4. Professors Henning and
Wallach support the minority viewpoint which does not require privity for revocation of acceptance
and refund. WILLIAM HENNING & GEORGE WALLACH, THE LAW OF SALES UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE$ 9.02[6] (1992). This article is my second shot at the majority viewpoint. My first
shot was in my article Rounding out the Remedial Structure of Article 2: The Case for a Forced
Exchange Between a Buyer and a Remote Seller. 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 353 (1994).
22. See supra note 20 for a listing of majority cases.
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against a remote or non-privity seller when the requirements of section
23
2-608 are met.

In the previously discussed hypothetical situation, suppose Eric's
dealer (immediate seller) went bankrupt between the time of sale and
Eric's attempt to revoke acceptance. Suppose further that an express
warranty on the clutch and drive belt, which warranty was breached, ran
not from the defunct dealer to Eric, but instead from the snowmobile
manufacturer (remote seller) to Eric. According to the majority
viewpoint, Eric could not employ section 2-608 to revoke acceptance
and section 2-711(1) to gain a refund from the manufacturer because of
lack of privity, no matter how serious the problem. Under the minority
viewpoint, however, Eric could use sections 2-608 and 2-711(1) to
revoke acceptance and obtain a refund of the purchase price from the
manufacturer. Consequently, the viewpoint adopted by the courts in
Eric's jurisdiction will have very serious consequences if Eric sues for
revocation of acceptance and refund.
In researching this privity problem, I became intrigued with
Troutman v. Pierce, Inc.24 in which the North Dakota Supreme Court
sustained a trial court's judgment which allowed revocation of acceptance
against an immediate seller where the only party in breach was a remote
seller.25 Neither the trial court nor the supreme court swept away the
privity requirement for revocation of acceptance (as have minority-view
courts), yet the privity doctrine did not constitute a bar to revocation of
acceptance. It occurred to me that perhaps the North Dakota Supreme
Court had devised a solution to the privity problem implicit in section
2-608 by simply focusing on the concept of non-conformity.
According to the court's reasoning, if a non-conformity substantially
impairs the value of the goods, revocation of acceptance and refund can
be allowed whether or not the immediate seller is in breach. Liability for
the purchase price, along with title to the non-conforming goods, can be

23. See supra note 21 for a listing of minority cases. I am not completely comfortable stating
whether North Dakota is in the minority or majority camp though I think it leans toward the majority
view. Based on dicta and the citation to WHITE AND SUMMERS, § 8-4, in Honey Hart Co. v. Cudworth,
446 N.W.2d 742 (N.D. 1989), it seems North Dakota should be classified as adhering to the majority
viewpoint (privity required). However, on the basis of Erling v. Homera. Inc., 298 N.W.2d 478 (N.D.
1980) (allowing revocation of acceptance and ordering refund by both the immediate and remote
seller) one could argue that minority viewpoint has been adopted. Since the absence of privity was not
discussed in the Erling opinion (and presumably was not argued), the North Dakota Supreme Court
cannot be said to have adopted the minority position allowing revocation of acceptance in the absence
of privity. Of course, Troutman v. Pierce, Inc., 402 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1987), assumes the necessity

of privity.
24. 402 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1987).
25. Troutman v. Pierce, Inc., 402 N.W.2d 920, 922-23 (N.D. 1987).
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passed up the distribution chain to the party who has breached a
warranty, and hence, was responsible for the non-conformity.
In pondering this matter, I have come to believe, however, that while
Troutman v. Pierce, Inc. was a good result on its facts, the opinion sowed
some seeds which will sprout some very bad law in the future if left
unchecked. A better choice would have been to tear down the privity
barrier to revocation of acceptance and refund.' In this article, I argue
the case for revocation of acceptance without privity. I use the Troutman
case in its factual setting to demonstrate that the North Dakota choice, if
followed, will lead to undesirable results, and, in any event, is violative of
the Code's remedial scheme as a whole. As the title to this article implies,
I believe that in the Troutman case, justice was achieved by outrunning
the law under Article 2.26 By "outrunning the law," I mean sustaining
entry of a judgment against a party whom the jury decided was not in
breach. Allowing judgment against a non-breaching seller is not in
accord with the remedial principles of Article 2 and has undesirable
policy implications which I will explore in the sections following.
II.

AN ANALYSIS OF TROUTMAN V. PIERCE

To lay the foundation for my viewpoint, I extensively use the trial
court record. 2 7 In sketching the story behind the supreme court's
opinion in Troutman, I use the following organization: (a) undisputed
facts, (b) disputed factual matters bearing on plaintiffs' theories of
liability, (c) evidence and arguments of counsel relating to revocation of
acceptance and refund, (d) the jury's answers to special interrogatories,
and (e) the trial judge's decision to order revocation of acceptance in
light of the jury's answers to special interrogatories. 28

26. Of course, if the jury verdict was erroneous on the evidence, an injustice was done to the
remote seller. Schult Home Corporation. However, Iam not trying to go behind the jury verdict for
which the record seems more than sufficient.
27. The whole of the file to which many citations are made in this article will be returned to
Bjella, Neff, Rathert, Wahl & Eiken in Williston. North Dakota and will henceforth remain in their
custody after the publication of this article. The briefs of the parties on appeal as well as the transcript
of proceedings are also available at the Thormodsgard Law Library at the University of North
Dakota, School of Law, Grand Forks, North Dakota.
28. I realize fully that in discussing undisputed and disputed "facts" I make statements and raise
questions that some lawyers would more exactingly describe as 'mixed" in the sense that matters of
fact and law are commingled. Moreover, in citing the transcript for facts, I am taking the transcript in
a light most favorable to the jury verdict. Finally, thematic unity requires that I sketch the story behind
the case in a manner not strictly chronological.
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UNDISPUTED FACTS

The case was tried in Ward County, North Dakota, during the week
of November 19, 1985.29 The evidence presented tended to establish
many basic background facts which were beyond any reasonable
dispute. While the following narrative statement is not based on
stipulations of the parties, I believe it to be fairly gleaned from the
transcript and exhibits.
In March 1982, the plaintiffs, Edward and Debra Troutman
(Troutmans), bought a mobile home from Pierce, Inc. (Pierce) at its sales
office in Williston, North Dakota. 3 0 The mobile home was manufactured
by Schult Home Corporation (Schult)3 1 whose factory and offices were
in Redwood Falls, Minnesota. 3 2 In making their purchase, Troutmans
did not deal with any Schult agent, 3 3 but dealt mainly with LeRoy
Larson, an agent for Pierce. 3 4 On or about April 1, 1982, Pierce
delivered the mobile home to Troutmans' reserved lot in Williston. 3 5
Troutmans commenced living in the mobile home on its delivery and
continued to living in it until January 1984.36 Troutmans accepted the
mobile home even though they knew of minor defects during the first
days living in it.37
In June or July, 1982, Edward Troutman skirted the mobile home
with plywood. 38 Schult's literature left in the mobile home stated that
plastic must be put down as a vapor barrier. 39 On the advice of LeRoy
Larson, Mr. Troutman did not put plastic (Visqueen) under the mobile
home for a vapor barrier as LeRoy deemed plastic unnecessary in the
North Dakota climate. 4 0

29. Transcript of Proceedings at I. Troutman v. Pierce, Inc., 402 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1987)
[hereinafter Transcript]. The Honorable Wallace D. Berning presided. Troutman, 402 N.W.2d at
920.
30. Transcript, supra note 29, at 92.
31. Id. at 90.
32. Id. at 382.
33. Id. at 215.
34. Id. at 92, 95.
35. Transcript, supra note 29, at 107, 108.
36. Id. at 155-56.
37. Id. at 113-15. Minor defects were repaired to Troutmans' satisfaction. Id. at 116. Failure to
make an effective rejection is an acceptance. See U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(b) (1989). Plaintiff's case
wherein revocation and refund of the price were sought assumes acceptance.
38. Transcript, supra note 29, at 111, 121-22, 230.
39. Id. at 239, 462.
40. Id. at 239-40.
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Troutmans received several written warranties with the delivery of
their mobile home.4 1 The written warranty relevant to this article was the
one year written warranty from Schult to Troutmans against "substantial
defects in materials and workmanship attributable to warrantor
[Schult]."42 This written warranty was "given out by Schult" as part of
the owner's manual. 43 At trial, Edward Troutman testified that he had
discussed this warranty with LeRoy (Pierce's agent) before he and Mrs.
Troutman made the purchase. 44 This was not disputed. 45 Therefore, the
jury had evidence to infer that the warranty was a factor that helped to
induce the sale.
While Pierce was not a warrantor, 46 it acted as an intermediary by
responding for Schult to warranty claims made by Troutmans on the
mobile home. 47 Troutmans made out a list of minor warranty claims,
including a flawed carpet, a chipped countertop and a broken coffee
table, within a month of occupancy. 4 8 These minor matters were
rectified to Troutmans' complete satisfaction by Pierce or through
connections made by Pierce. 49 Subsequently, Troutmans discovered a
water problem in their front bedroom. 50 There was a puddle on the

41. Id. at 96-102.
42. Id. at 95-98. The Schult warranty which was entered into the record as Plaintiff's Exhibit 35
was quoted in relevant part on the cited pages of the transcript. Exhibit 35 was not made part of the
record on appeal. In any event, I have not been able to locate it. The phrases quoted in the transcript
are, however, sufficient to establish the meaning of the express warranty under section 2-313 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.
43. Transcript, supra note 29. at 96.
44. Id. at 95, 98, 225-26.
45. Id. at 95. Edward Troutman testified:
Q Okay. While the financing was taking place did you discuss with anybody the
warranties that you were going to receive as part of this purchase of the mobile home?
A Yes, we discussed it quite a bit of warranties before we signed everything, first.
Q And who did you discuss those with first?
A Mr. LeRoy, the person we bought the home through.
Q Do you recall what he told you about those warranties or did he show warranties to
you or what took place?
A He had one little warranty on Schult Home, just one little piece of paper and he said
that I would get more with the trailer when I got it. And then he said it was a one year
warranty and then he said I had a five year warranty on all the appliances in the home.
Id.
46. Transcript, supra note 29. at 33, 1 6; Appendix on Appeal, Troutman v. Pierce. Inc., 402
N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1987) [hereinafter Appellate Appendix]. Troutmans alleged that Pierce had made
a warranty. The jury found to the contrary. See infra Appendix 2 (reproducing the verdict form with
special interrogatories).
47. Transcript, supra note 29, at 105, 459-60. While the record is not clear. Pierce must have
had an agreement for reimbursement from Schult for the initial responses on warranty items.
48. Id. at 113.
49. Id. at 114-118. Edward Troutman refers to the repairman, Person. as a Schult man. Id. at
114. This initial warranty work was completed on May 10, 1982. Id. at 115.
50. Id. at 122-23, 200-02.
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floor. 5 1 An inspection revealed an exterior wall in the front bedroom
was saturated two and one half feet up from the floor.52 Mr. Troutman
53
found some wall saturation in other rooms of the mobile home.
54
Troutmans contacted Pierce and Schult about the water problem.
In March 1983, Albert Panitzke, who did warranty work for Schult,
inspected Troutmans' mobile home. 55 Mr. Panitzke returned one month
later and made extensive repairs to the interior, including installing new
sheetrock and paneling on two walls. 5 6 Mr. Panitzke did not work on the
exterior of the mobile home. 57 However, at this time, Mr. Troutman told
Mr. Panitzke that some of the siding was warped. 5 8 At the trial, Mr.
Panitzke recalled this statement. 5 9 There was never any dispute that
some siding was warped, but the cause of the warping was always in
dispute. 6 0 Likewise, there was never any dispute about the presence of
excessive moisture in two exterior walls; the cause of the saturation was
disputed.
When Mr. Panitzke completed his work on the mobile home's
interior, but declined to do any work on the exterior, Mr. Troutman
indicated his concern about the siding by writing the following on a
Schult work order: "I am very pleased with Albert's work but it would be
a shame to see his work destroyed due to no new siding put on and I am
6
very upset that I have to wait for the siding." 1
Subsequently, Schult contacted the manufacturer of the siding,
Masonite, about inspecting the siding. 62 Masonite contacted Troutmans
and requested pictures of the siding. 6 3 Troutmans refused to furnish

51. Id. at 123.
52. Transcript, supra note 29,at 124.
53. Id. There was water in the daughter's bedroom and in the bathroom. Id.
54. id. Mr. Troutman testified:
Q Okay. What did you do when you found this defect or what you thought was a defect?
A I then called Schult immediately. I was really upset when I found this water.
Q Was it Schult or Pierce that you called immediately?
A Well, I called Schult and then I called Pierce. I called everybody is what I ended up
doing...
54. Id. It should be noted that while the time of notice of the problem was hotly disputed. e.g.,
at 196-200. the fact that Troutmans discovered a water problem and gave Pierce and Schult notice
the problem was never subject to dispute.
55. Id. at 137.
56. Id. at 138-39, 159-160.
57. Transcript, supra note 29, at 162-63.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 427-28. Joel Buller, who testified for Schult, also admitted that Exhibit 24 (picture
outside wall) showed warping which he attributed to moisture from the inside of the mobile home.
at 463-64.
60. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (discussing disputed matters).
61. Transcript, supra note 29, at 136. 396 and exhibit 49.
62. Id. at 432-33, 469.
63. Id. at 274,468-69.

id.
of

of
Id.
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pictures to Masonite taking the position that they had no warranty from
Masonite and that the siding was Schult's problem. 6 4 Meanwhile,
Troutmans, without results, expected Schult to dispatch a crew to replace
the siding in early July 1983.65 In August 1983, Troutmans wrote to
66
Pierce complaining about the handling of the water problem.
Frustrated by the lack of any meaningful response, Troutmans sent a
notice of revocation of acceptance to Pierce by letter dated September
22, 1983.67 Pierce, through counsel, declined to acknowledge the right
of revocation and refused to take the mobile home back. 68 Troutmans
did not send notice of revocation of acceptance to Schult. 69
Sometime later in the fall, 1983, Mrs. Troutman received an
electrical shock. 70 After removing the outlet cover, Mr. Troutman found
an accumulation of water. 7 1 Apparently, convinced that the home was
unsafe, Troutmans, through counsel, filed suit against Pierce on October
28, 1983, and sought, inter alia, revocation of acceptance and refund of
the purchase price. 7 2 Schult was added as a party defendant on
November 18, 1983; however, Troutmans did not plead for revocation of
acceptance or refund against Schult. 73 Pierce cross-claimed against
Schult for indemnity. 74 In January, 1984, Troutmans moved out of the
mobile home. 75 Pierce thereafter took possession of the mobile home.76
The record does not reveal whether or not the siding was ever replaced. 77
B.

DISPUTED FACTUAL MATTERS

The main factual dispute was the cause of the excessive moisture in
two exterior walls of the mobile home. 7 8 Also in dispute were the dates

64. Id. at 167, 274-75, 329.
65. Id. at 165-66. 363-64.
66. Transcript, supra note 29, at 171.
67. Id. at 175-76. exhibit 53; Appellate Appendix, supra note 46 at 189. See infra Appendix I for
a reproduction of the letter. While signed only by Edward J. and Debra K. Troutman, it appears to
have been drafted by counsel as it cites the N.D. Century Code and is tailored to meet the criteria of
section 2-608 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
68. Transcript, supra note 29, at 176; Appendix Appendix. supra note 46. at 29.
69. Transcript, supra note 29, at 279-80. 365.
70. Id. at 177.
71. Id. at 178.
72. Id. at 179. See also Complaint October 28, 1983.
73. See Appellate Appendix, Amended Complaint, supra note 46. at 2-9.
74. See id. Pierce Cross-claim, at 13-16.
75. Transcript, supra note 29, at 179.
76. Id. at 183-84 (indicating that the parties stipulated that Pierce take possession).
77. See id. at 471. According to Joel Buller: "The photographs we looked at yesterday,
everything appears to be fine with it on the location it is at now." Id.
78. A reading of the entire transcript shows that there was never any doubt that some of the walls
were saturated when Albert Panitzke came to the mobile home site in Williston in March of 1983. The
fact that excess moisture was in some the walls and that these walls required extensive interior
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when the Troutmans discovered and gave notice of the moisture
79
problem.
Schult's case was based on the theory that the excessive moisture in
the walls was due to excessive humidity and accompanying condensation
inside the mobile home. 80 Schult stuck tenaciously to the condensation
theory and sought to establish the truth of this theory based on one or
more of the following reasons: lack of plastic under the mobile home. 8 1
lack of adequate vents in the plywood skirting, 8 2 improper venting of a
clothes dryer, 83 and an unauthorized installation of a gas water heater. 84
Mr. Troutman testified that a Schult representative in a telephone
conversation added another possible cause: that his infant daughter
might be watering the wall with a hose. 85
Troutmans' case rested upon the theory that the moisture problems
were caused by rainwater penetrating the walls through cracks and gaps
in the Masonite siding. 8 6 They did not believe that the siding itself was
defective; rather, they thought it had been installed improperly. 8 7 Schult
took no action to make any repairs on the siding though someone from
Schult did contact Masonite setting in motion the request for photographs which Troutmans declined to furnish. 8 8 Troutmans clung as
tenaciously to the rainwater theory as Schult did to the condensation
9
theory. 8

remedial work was never in dispute.
79. Apart from the dispute over damages, all factual disputes in one way or another related to the
issues of causation, timeliness of the notice Troutmans gave, and opportunity to cure.
80. Id. at 392-93, 400, 413-14. 419-20. 464-65, 472. Schult fastened onto the condensation
theory early on and never let go. According to Albert Panitzke:
Q Isn't it true, Mr. Panitzke, that somebody at Schult before you even arrived at Mr.
Troutman's home had already decided that the house's problem was moisture and
condensation? Hadn't that already been decided by Schult?
A Yes
Id. at 423, 443.
81. Transcript, supra note 29. at 237, 462.
82. Id. at 397-99, 461-62.
83. Id. at 401,463.
84. Id. at 454-55.
85. Id. at 129.
86. Transcript, supra note 29, at 155-56, 174-75, 189-91, 359-60.
87. Id. at 190-91. The record contains evidence of the sincerity of their belief. Mr. Troutman
borrowed a caulking gun from Mr. Panitzke and caulked some outside cracks himself. Id. at 163.
88. Appellate Appendix, supra note 46, at 42-45. See infra Appendix I (containing the
reproduction of Troutmans' letter).
89. Of course, the jury agreed with Troutmans. Appellate Appendix, supra note 46. at 69-73.
See infra Appendix 2 (containing a reproduction of the verdict form with special interrogatories).
Additionally, the jury specifically found that Troutmans had given reasonable notice of the water
problem to both defendants. Id. Interrogatories 6, 7. A finding of notice within a reasonable time was
required for use of section 2-608 of the Uniform Commerical Code.
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THE RECORD RELATING TO REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE

Troutmans' letter demanding revocation of acceptance was directed
only to Pierce. 9 0 Troutmans did not give notice of revocation to
Schult.91
Furthermore, Troutmans' Amended Complaint sought
revocation of acceptance against Pierce (the immediate seller), not
against Schult (the remote seller). 92 Troutmans' counsel never sought to
accomplish a forced exchange (goods for payments) between Troutmans
and Schult. During the trial, Troutmans both testified that they only
sought to revoke acceptance against Pierce. 93 Yet, each of them testified
that Pierce did everything it could to solve their problems that originated
with Schult's improper assembly of the mobile home's siding. 94 Hence,
their remedial objective was aimed at the party whom each tended by
testimony to exculpate completely, namely, Pierce.
When the jury verdict exculpating Pierce had come in, and post-trial
motions were on for hearing, Pierce's counsel did not argue against
revocation of acceptance as the appropriate remedy, but rather built a
case for indemnification from Schult. For example, in support of
Pierce's post-trial motion for indemnity, counsel argued: "Plaintiffs are
arguably entitled to revoke acceptance of the home against Pierce, even
if the jury also determined that Pierce did not expressly or impliedly
warrant the Schult home purchased by Troutmans."95
Thus, counsel for Troutmans and counsel for Pierce laid the
groundwork for revocation against the seller in privity on the shared
assumption that revocation against the remote seller was not allowed
under section 2-608. Their assumption was in accord with-most of the
cases which had been decided as of November 1985, when their case was

90. See infra Appendix I (containing a reproduction of exhibit 53).
91. Transcript, supra note 29, at 279, 365.
92. See Appellate Appendix. supra note 46. at 2-9 (containing Amended Complaints Counts I &
II and prayer for relief). However, in Count II plaintiffs did demand refund from Schult which would
seem logically to follow from revocation of acceptance. Id.
93. Transcript, supranote 29, at 265, 279-80.
94. Id. at 190-91. 354.
95. See Appellate Appendix, supra note 46, at 62 (containing the Brief in Support of Motion for
Entry of Judgment in Favor of Pierce, Inc. and against Schult Home Corporation on Defendant Pierce.
Inc.'s Crossclaim for Indemnity).
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tried.9 6 The minority view allowing revocation of acceptance had barely
97
begun to blossom.
D.

THE COURT'S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES TO THE JURY98

The jury found that Schult, but not Pierce, had made an express
warranty to Troutmans. 99 The jury made the same findings as to an
implied warranty of merchantability. 10 0 The jury also found that the
mobile home was substantially defective and that Schult was given both
reasonable notice of the defects and reasonable opportunity to remedy
the defects. 10 1 The jury further found that the substantial defects were
Schult's responsibility, and that there were no substantial defects which
were Pierce's responsibility.1 02 Not surprisingly, therefore, the jury
found that Schult had breached the express and implied warranties;1 03
but, having made no warranties, Pierce had breached none. 104
The jury determined that the defects had substantially impaired the
value of the mobile home to Troutmans and that Troutmans had
received no benefit by occupancy of the home.1 0 5 Finally, the jury
awarded Troutmans $6,591 paid on the mobile home and $7,000 in
incidental and consequential damages.10 6 In summary, the jury found
the facts in favor of Troutmans, against Schult, and exculpated Pierce.
So, what should a trial judge do when the jury finds for the immediate
seller and against the remote seller, but the main remedy sought is
directed against the immediate seller?

96. See supranote 21 (defining the majority viewpoint).
97. There were a very few cases allowing revocation of acceptance and refund against remote
sellers. Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1978); Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Harper. 671 F.2d 1117 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Arkansas law); Royal Lincoln-Mercury Sales, Inc. v.
Wallace, 415 S.2d 1024 (Miss. 1982). In any event, Mr. McKechnie won everything he sought to win
for Troutmans, and Mr. Brakke gained complete indemnity for Pierce. Assuming the jury was right,
justice was done in a round-about way.
98. The special interrogatories and the jury's answers are affixed to this article as Appendix 2.
99. See infra Appendix 2, Interrogatories 1, 2.
100. See infra Appendix 2, Interrogatories 3, 4.
101. See infra Appendix 2, Interrogatories 5, 6, 8.
102. See infra Appendix 2, Interrogatories 10, 11.
103. See infra Appendix 2, Interrogatories 11, 13.
104. In light of the prior findings favorable to Pierce, the jury quite sensibly did not answer
interrogatories 12 & 14. See infra Appendix 2. Interrogatories 12, 14.
105. The jury's answers to interrogatories constitute an explicit finding that the unremedied
defects substantially impaired the value of the mobile home to the Troutmans. See infra Appendix 2,
Interrogatories 15, 18.
106. See infra Appendix 2, Interrogatories 16, 17. The trial judge subsequently reduced the
incidental and consequential damages to $1500 to accord with the evidence. Appellate Appendix
supra note 46, at 127. The order was entered by Judge Wallace D. Beming on March 10. 1986.
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THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT BASED ON THE JURY'S
ANSWERS TO THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES

On January 27, 1986, counsel appeared for arguments on post-trial
motions. The court heard arguments on Pierce's motion for indemnity
against Schult.107 Based on the jury's answers to the special interrogatories, the inevitable question arose: Should Schult be liable to Pierce if
Pierce was not liable to Troutmans? As noted earlier, Pierce's counsel
did not quarrel with Troutmans' claim for revocation of acceptance
against Pierce; 108 rather, at the motion hearing he set up the claim for
indemnity by emphasizing the fact that Pierce was merely an "intermediate link in the chain of commerce." 1 0 9
Mr. Brakke: The difficulty, Your Honor, is that as I understand
North Dakota law, North Dakota's formulation of the Uniform
Commercial Code because of the rules as far as extension of
express and implied warranty the intermediate link in the chain
of commerce, the wholesaler or the retailer, is going to be
equally liable with the manufacturer to the consumer simply
based on the fact that the product sold did not work regardless
of who was responsible for the failure of the product to
function as it should or could reasonably have been expected
to. But the liability in that situation, Your Honor, is derived
from the fault of the manufacturer. The retailer and the
wholesaler are vicariously, secondarily or passively liable for
the active, primary and direct fault of the manufacturer. It is
the manufacturer that designs the product, constructs it, and
first markets that product, Your Honor. If the product doesn't
function properly, as certainly in a case here where the retailer
didn't alter the product whatsoever, the true responsibility for
the malfunction of the product must go back to the manufacturer, Schult, and, Your Honor, I think that the question of
indemnity, Pierce's recovery of indemnity from Schult, is
extremely clear under North Dakota law. The jury absolutely
and concretely determined that Pierce did not expressly or
impliedly warrant the mobile home so there is no different

107. Pierce, through its counsel, Mr. Jon Brakke. sought to be indemnified for attorney's fees. but
also for any liability which might be imposed upon Pierce as immediate seller due to the jury's
determination of Schult's breaches of warranty.
108. Being liable for the purchase price to the extent paid would follow from revocation of
acceptance. See U.C.C. § 2-71 1(l)
(1989).
109. Transcript. supra note 29, at 632-33.
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express or implied warranties extended by the retailer other
than those extended by the manufacturer, that is the mobile
home was defective, but those defects weren't Pierce's
responsibility. In that kind of situation, Your Honor, even if
because of those defects in the product which were Schult's
fault, plaintiffs have a right to revoke their acceptance of the
retail contract against Pierce, the true responsibilityfor that
right to revoke is against Schult or lands on Schult's doorstep
and I think that is the determinative question as far as Pierce's
right to indemnity in this particularcase, Your Honor. 10
Assuming Troutmans' right to revoke acceptance against Pierce,
counsel argued that Pierce must necessarily have an indemnity claim
because the jury put the breach of warranty liability only on Schult.
Thus, Pierce's liability was vicarious and passive. Schult's counsel,"I' in
attempting to avoid indemnity, countered with the argument that,
because the jury had exculpated Pierce, there was no liability for which
any indemnity could be owed.
Mr. Peterson: Your Honor, on the indemnity claim, I believe
the way the jury answered the special interrogatories that there
is no claim over - or that Pierce has against Schult .... 112
What I am saying, the way the jury found, Pierce was
exonerated by the jury. Therefore, if they are exonerated, the
only way Pierce can seek to be indemnified by Schult was if
there had been some liability assessed to Pierce. 113
The argument thereafter turned to the fundamental question to
which this article is addressed:
Mr. Brakke: Your Honor, I think one of the interesting
cases-or interesting questions in this case which arguably has
yet to be resolved and really can't be resolved at this point in
time is whether where a retailer is not found to have expressly
or implied warranteda product, if it is found that the product
is substantially defective, whether the consumer can still revoke
acceptance against the retailer.114

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 630-32 (emphasis added).
Mr. Donald Peterson, Minot. North Dakota.
Transcript, supra note 29. at 635.
Id. at 636.
Id. at 639 (emphasis added).
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Later, Troutmans' counsel 115 raised the question of revocation of
acceptance for clarification:
Mr. McKechnie: I guess, Your Honor, for the record to clarify,
are you going to-based on the jury's special interrogatories in
the verdict, are you going to find we had a proper revocation
of acceptance?116
Judge Berning: I am going to find there was a proper
revocation of acceptance. I don't think the court can-find any
differently based upon that. And I think that will finally bring
i1 7
this trial to a close at least in district court.
My purpose in quoting extensively from the counsels' arguments
and comments of the trial judge is not to second-guess anybody's
lawyering skills but to shed light on the questions that will inevitably
arise in any case where revocation of acceptance is the sought-after
remedy, and a breach is found against the remote seller; but no breach is
found against the immediate seller. 1 18 The trial judge sought justice by
allowing revocation of acceptance against the immediate seller (Pierce)
and allowing indemnity against the remote seller (Schult). 1 19 Yet, on
February 10, 1986, judgment was entered in favor of Troutmans against
both defendants for refund of that part of the purchase price which
Troutmans had paid and for incidental/consequential damages and
interest. 120 On the same date, judgment was entered in favor of Pierce
against Schult for complete indemnity plus attorney's fees and costs
incurred by Pierce. 121 Thus, Pierce was a conduit for the imposition of
Code remedies against Schult. 122

115. Mr. William McKechnie.
116. Transcript, supra note 29, at 645.
117. Id. at 645-46.
118. Supposing I were critical. I have yet to meet a trial lawyer who loses sleep over academic
critics.
119. Transcript, supra note 29, at 645-46.
120. Appellate Appendix, supra note 46, at 115. Since the first paragraph of the judgment
entered on February 10. 1986. id. at 119, granted revocation of acceptance and damages without
naming the defendants (either Schult or Pierce), and the next paragraph awarded fees only against
Schult, it is possible that the first paragraph was a joint judgment, The point is academic as Pierce was
a party against whom judgment was entered and to whom indemnity was granted. Judge Bering later
reduced the incidental/consequential damages award to $1500. Id. at 127.
121. Id. at 115.
122. By order dated March 10. 1986, Judge Beming reduced the incidental/consequential
damages from $7000 to $1500. Appellate Appendix. supra note 46. at 127.
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TROUTMAN V. PIERCE ON APPEAL

Schult appealed arguing, inter alia, that there could be no valid
revocation of acceptance against Pierce because the jury had found that
Pierce was not responsible for any defects that had not been remedied. 123
Logically, it would seem, if Troutmans' case against Pierce could be
destroyed, the claim for indemnity would have no basis. Responding to
Schult's argument, the North Dakota Supreme Court quoted section
2-608 and then sought to apply its principles to resolve the question
raised by Schult.
The court stated:
The buyer's right of revocation is not conditioned upon
whether it is the seller or the manufacturer that is responsible
for the nonconformity. Under 41-02-71 (2-608), N.D.C.C,, a
buyer is entitled to revoke his acceptance of a unit if a
"nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him,"
regardless of whether it is the seller or the manufacturer that is
responsible for the nonconformity. The jury found that there
were substantial defects in the mobile home that substantially
impaired its value to the Troutmans and constituted breaches of
express and implied warranties. The jury also found that
Schult and Pierce were given reasonable notice of the defects
and a reasonable opportunity to remedy the defects. Thus, the
trial court did not err in determining that the Troutmans had
validly revoked their acceptance of the mobile home.12 4
The court read the statute's allowance of revocation for nonconformity to mean that the remedy of revocation (and presumably
refund) can be used whether or not the party against whom these
remedies are directly employed is liable for breach of warranty or any
other breach of obligation. The remedy of revocation of acceptance was
thereby detached from liability for a breach of warranty. The court
focused on the concept of non-conformity to justify revocation of
acceptance when the immediate seller (Pierce) had not made any

123. Brief for Appellant Schult Home Corporation at 16-17, Troutman v. Pierce, Inc.. 402
N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1987). Counsel argued:
The jury specifically found in special interrogatory 10 that none of the defects which
were not remedied were the responsibility of the seller, Pierce. To find that the
Troutmans could revoke their acceptance against Pierce when none of the defects which
were not remedied were its responsibility leads to an irrational result.
Id. at 17.
124. 402 N.W.2d at 922-23 (emphasis added).
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warranty. Thus, Pierce's liability or responsibility to take back the
mobile home and to refund the purchase price,1 25 as well as Pierce's
immediate liability for incidental and consequential damages, was
vicarious. 12 6 Of course, vicarious liability justified indemnity.
Consider in light of the language of the opinion the judgments
which the court was sustaining: on February 10, 1986, the Clerk of
District Court pursuant to the trial court's orders had entered a judgment
for Troutmans against Pierce and a judgment allowing indemnity for
Pierce against Schult. The latter judgment in pertinent part shows the
complete picture:
[iut is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that judgment be
entered in favor of Pierce, Inc. and against Schult Home
Corporation for indemnity in the sum of $16,756.55 which
sum Pierce, Inc. was adjudged liable to Plaintiffs, Edward J.
Troutman and Debra K. Troutman; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that
judgment be entered in favor of Pierce, Inc. and against Schult
Home Corporation for fees in the sum of $5,180.00, and costs
in the sum of $800.10 making a total judgment in the amount
of $22,736.65.127
At first glance, it might appear that the Supreme Court of North
Dakota sustained a trial court's resolution of the privity problem because
Troutmans were allowed to recover against Schult through Pierce. On
reflection, however, my viewpoint is that the court's decision sustaining
these judgments creates significant policy problems and is violative of
the Code's remedial scheme. In the parts of this article which follow, I
will first try to demonstrate the negative policy implications of the court's
opinion in Troutman v. Pierce and will then examine Troutman v. Pierce
in light of the intricacies of Article 2's remedial scheme.

125. The liability for the purchase price was liability to the extent paid which the jury found to be
$6,591.00. Troutman, 402 N.W.2d at 922. See also infra Appendix 2.
126. The court does not use the term "vicarious" but this seems fair in light of the jury verdict and
the judgments. Of course, Mr. Brakke in arguing for indemnity had used the term "vicarious" to
describe Pierce's liability on account of Schult's breaches.
127. Appellate Appendix. supra note 46, at 115 (emphasis added). The judgment was also
entered in favor of Troutmans against Pierce and in favor of Troutmans directly against Schult for
fees and costs. Id. at 119-20.
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III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND TEXTUAL COMPLICATIONS
ARISING FROM TROUTMAN V. PIERCE
A.

WHY IS TROUTMAN V. PIERCE BAD POLICY?

In my view, Troutman v. Pierce is bad policy for three reasons: (1)
a non-breaching party was left in a lawsuit as a conduit for employing a
remedy against the breaching party; (2) a non-breaching party
(immediate seller) had a judgment entered against it for a substantial
sum of money and would have suffered a gross injustice but for
indemnity; and (3) by implication, revocation of acceptance due to
breach by a remote seller is contingent upon the immediate seller's
128
existence and amenability to process.
A non-breaching seller in privity with a complaining buyer should
not be kept in a lawsuit for revocation of acceptance as a conduit for
implementation of the remedy against a remote, breaching seller.
Troutmans' evidence arguably raised one or more jury questions on
whether or not Pierce had made and breached a warranty. Hence,
summary judgment for Pierce before trial, or a directed verdict for
Pierce during the trial, would have been error. However, the cases are
legion in which dealers disclaim all warranties but pass on manufacturers'
express warranties. This apparently was the jury's conclusion as to
Pierce's role in this case. In such a case, if the immediate seller
establishes grounds for dismissal as a matter of law before the case goes
to the fact-finder, but the requisite defect and degree of impairment and
notice are proved with respect to the remote seller, should the dealer
(immediate seller) be kept in the suit as a mere conduit? The implication
of the Troutman v. Pierce opinion is an affirmative answer to this
question. Yet, the unfairness and inefficiency implied by an affirmative
answer are apparent when one considers the costs, time investments and
inconvenience of a lawsuit. A non-breaching party defendant should
incur neither costs nor fees nor the trouble of a suit (even if indemnity is
possible) when non-liability is clear as a matter of law.
It is clear that holding a non-breaching immediate seller in a suit to
allow the buyer to obtain a remedy against the remote seller through the
immediate seller undercuts substantive rights afforded to sellers by
Article 2. Under Article 2, a seller is free to disclaim all implied

128. This criticism assumes that the North Dakota Supreme would not have allowed revocation
of acceptance and refund apart from liability of the immediate seller in Erling v. Homera, Inc., 298
N.W.2d 478 (N.D. 1980). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
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warranties. 129 No seller is obliged to make any express warranty by
promise, affirmation or otherwise. 13 0 Pursuant to section 2-312, a seller
can even disclaim the implied warranty of good title. 13 1 Moreover,
Article 2 allows a seller to limit remedies which a buyer may employ.132
The Code's warranties and remedies are, in a sense, "default
provisions." If the parties to a sale do not negotiate specific terms
different from the off-the-rack Code terms, then Article 2's warranties
and remedies become part of the contract by default. 133 The fact that
Code-provided warranties and remedies can be disclaimed or limited by
agreement is indicative of a high level of contractual freedom permitted
in sales transactions. Exercising this freedom, a seller may elect to make
no warranties (perhaps selling for less) intending thereby to be free of
claims or lawsuits. To allow revocation of acceptance against a party
who made no warranty, 13 4 and hence breached no warranty, is to impose
a remedy in the absence of any liability, thereby thwarting the seller's
intent to run an economically sound operation. This seriously undercuts
the freedom allowed to a seller under Article 2 and awards the buyer
more than any reasonable buyer could expect when buying in the face
of a disclaimer of implied warranties without any express warranties.
Because it tends to disturb the reasonable economic expectations of
sellers and buyers, awarding any remedy in the absence of breach is
simply bad policy. In Troutman, the court modified the agreed-upon
contractual obligations by imposing a remedial role on a non-breaching
intermediate party, that is, by using Pierce as a party through whom
liability could be passed upstream to Schult. On the particular facts of
this case, perhaps there was no injustice, or only a slight injustice, since a
judgment for complete indemnity was awarded for Pierce against Schult
when judgment was entered against Pierce. Nonetheless, as a matter of
principle, the non-breaching seller should be dismissed when nonliability becomes clear. Holding an immediate seller in a suit merely as a

129. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (1989). In a few states, implied warranties cannot be disclaimed in
consumer sales. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316A (West 1990). However. even in
Massachusetts a seller can disclaim all implied warranties in sale to a non-consumer buyer.
130. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1989) (allowing express warranties to be made by promise, affirmation of
fact, description, sample or model).
131. U.C.C. § 2-312(2) (1989).
132. See U.C.C. § 2-719(1) (allowing "repair and replacement of defective parts"). This would
preclude revocation of acceptance and refund unless the remedy failed of its essential purpose
pursuant to section 2-719(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code or unless unconscionability were
established under section 2-302.
133. The contract is the total legal obligation of the parties including the supplemental terms
imposed by the Code. See U.C.C. § 1-201(11) (1989).
134. According to the jury in Troutman. See infra Appendix 2.
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conduit for implementing a remedy against a remote seller in breach
constitutes an institutionalized infringement on the freedom of contract.
While an argument rooted in freedom of contract may seem
abstract, Troutman could easily lead to a concrete economic injustice. A
non-breaching immediate seller will suffer the injustice of a judgment on
the public records (in the absence of liability) and will suffer a worse
injustice if indemnity against the party in breach cannot be speedily and
efficiently collected. As noted earlier, the trial court in Troutman
entered judgment against Pierce for the amount of the refund and for
incidental and consequential damages.1 3 5 Perhaps the supreme court
would have decided the case differently if the record had shown that
Schult was not a party from whom Pierce could gain indemnity. But, the
fact remains that judgment was entered on the public record for a
substantial sum against a non-breaching party.
I do not know whether or not the judgment appeared as Pierce's
corporate liability in any audit or financial statement. The judgment
may not have affected Pierce's credit or credit rating in any manner. 13 6
Nonetheless, the danger of entering judgments against non-breaching
parties is obvious. Anyone who has endured a credit investigation will
understand that a late payment of a nominal sum to a department store
can raise a red flag for a lender. Common knowledge dictates that any
judgment impairs a person's credit rating. Thus, a judgment in the
absence of a breach is a species of court-inflicted economic injury, of
greater or lesser severity, depending upon the size of the judgment and
the size and reputation of the defendant.
Quite apart from the entry of the judgment, there is the burden of
collecting, and the risk of not collecting the indemnity judgment. I am
informed by counsel that Pierce collected the indemnity judgment
against Schult. 13 7 Nonetheless, a judgment for indemnity is no more a
bird in the hand than any other judgment. Collection of the judgment
turns on the defendant's resources and the degree of cooperation the
defendant puts forth either to pay or to allow the sale of assets to effect
payment. Putting the burden of collection, and the risk of non-payment,
upon the non-breaching immediate seller is unfair, especially when the
judgment is not merely for return of the purchase price, but also for

135. The judgment for $8,500 attorney's fees in plaintiffs' favor ran only against Schult Home
Corporation. Appellate Appendix, supra note 46, at 119.
136. I infer from a conversation with Pierce's counsel that Pierce, Inc. is no longer in business.
137. Telephone interview with Jon Brakke, Fargo, North Dakota, attorney for Pierce, Inc.
(September 12. 1994).
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incidental and consequential damages attributable only to the remote
138
seller's breach.
Suppose an indemnity award and its prompt collection minimizes
or erases any economic injury to the immediate seller; even so, it does
not follow that revocation of acceptance against the immediate seller for
the sins of the remote seller makes sense. An aggrieved buyer's rights
against a remote seller in breach should not be contingent upon a
non-breaching immediate seller's existence or amenability to legal
process. A problem inherent in the supreme court's affirmance focusing
on "non-conformity" instead of liability for breach is that the aggrieved
buyer's rights against the remote seller appear to be contingent upon the
existence and amenability to suit of the immediate seller. If one assumes
that revocation of acceptance can only be made against an immediate
seller, it follows that the immediate seller must exist and be amenable to
process for the court to impose the remedy. Assume, however, that a
corporation playing the role of immediate seller is dissolved, voluntarily
or involuntarily. 139 Or assume that a natural person playing the role of
immediate seller moves to a foreign country and is not amenable to
service of process. Should the dissolution of a corporate entity or the
disappearance of a natural person (each in the position of immediate
seller) preclude revocation of acceptance and refund against the
breaching remote seller for want of a link in the chain of distribution?
From a policy perspective the answer is negative. Making liability
for revocation of acceptance and refund contingent upon the existence
and amenability to suit of an immediate seller when the remote seller is
in breach results in a buyers' rights turning on the business or personal
fortunes of a non-breaching party. Viewing such contingencies as
conditions precedent to liability of a remote seller is unnecessary and
unfair. This may have been an unarticulated assumption in Erling v.
Homera, Inc. 140 in which the North Dakota Supreme Court sustained a
trial court judgment which allowed revocation of acceptance of a mobile
home and ordered refund of the purchase price by the manufacturer as
well as the immediate seller. 14 1 If Erling should be read to allow

138. This was the situation in Troutman. Appellate Appendix, supranote 46,at 117-20.
139. For example, in North Dakota a corporation can be dissolved involuntarily by an action
commenced by the attorney general for several reasons listed in section 10-19.1-118 of the North
Dakota Century Code.
140. 298 N.W. 2d 478 (N.D. 1980).
141. Erling v. Homera, Inc., 298 N.W.2d 478, 484 (N.D. 1980). The case is strikingly similar to
Troutman v. Pierce on its facts. Erlings purchased a mobile home from Jerry Carlson dlb/a J & J
Trailer Sales in Jamestown. Id. at 479. The mobile home had been manufactured by Homera, Inc., a
Minnesota corporation. Id. The mobile home developed a moisture problem. Id. After repeated
efforts to solve the problem failed. Erlings gave notice of rescission. From records I procured from
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revocation of acceptance and refund without privity,1 4 2 it would have
made sense in Troutman for the judgment for the purchase price and for
incidental/consequential damages to have been entered in Troutmans'
favor directly against Schult. However, in Troutman the necessity of
Pierce's presence as an intermediate party seems to have been assumed.
Since Pierce, a corporate entity, remained viable and appeared by
counsel in the suit, the problem inherent in assuming privity as a
requisite for revocation of acceptance was covered up. I am not
suggesting it was a deliberate "cover-up" in the sense of wrong-doing. I
mean simply that events, including Pierce's appearance, suppressed a
problem inherent in the notion of allowing revocation only against a
seller in privity, namely: an aggrieved buyer is left dangling in the wind
if the immediate seller disappears and the court precludes a direct action
for revocation of acceptance and refund against the remote seller.
To summarize in light of Troutman, policy considerations all drive
in one direction: toward allowing revocation of acceptance against a
breaching remote seller when the procedural and substantive requisites
of section 2-608 are met. If this had been accepted legal doctrine in
North Dakota in 1983, prudent practice would have required that notice
of revocation of acceptance would have been given to Schult as well as
Pierce.1 4 3 Counsel could have tried the case offering evidence of
warranties and breach pertaining to both defendants, as Troutmans'
counsel did at the trial. When the jury, rightly instructed, found Schult,
not Pierce, liable for breach, then judgment for revocation and refund,
damages, fees and costs would have been entered only against Schult.
No judgment would have been entered against Pierce; rather, an order
would have been entered dismissing the case against Pierce. Thus, the

the Clerk of the District Court, Stutsmans County, it is clear that the buyers gave notice to both the
immediate seller (Carlson) and the remote seller (Homera); in any event, the trial judge so found in his
findings of fact and memorandum opinion. The judgment for revocation and refund was affirmed.
Erling v. Homera, Inc., 298 N.W.2d 479 (N.D. 1980), but there was a remand for determination of a
set-off for Erlings' use of the mobile home. Thus, while privity or the lack thereof was not at issue on
the appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota clearly sustained a judgment for revocation and
refund which ran directly against the remote as well as against the immediate seller.
142. The opinion does not expressly state that revocation of acceptance without privity is
allowed. Such a conclusion would contradict the express language of Honey Hart Co. v. Cudworth,
446 N.W.2d 742 (N.D. 1989). See supra note 20, (citing jurisdictional views of privity requirement).
Yet, the Supreme Court in fact sustained a joint judgment which included judgment for refund against
the remote seller. Homera, Inc. See supra note 141.
143. Of course, trying to use revocation of acceptance against a remote seller was not accepted
doctrine except in a very few jurisdictions. See supra note 20 (citing minority viewpoint regarding
privity requirement).
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non-breaching party (Pierce) would have had no remedy imposed
against it144 and the party in breach would have been directly liable to
Troutmans for refund of the price and for incidental/consequential
damages.
B.

TEXTUAL INTEGRITY: ARE REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE AND
REFUND OF THE PRICE ALLOWED AGAINST A REMOTE SELLER
UNDER ARTICLE 2's TEXT?

Although I believe Troutman is shaky on policy grounds, my main
argument against the decision is that it violates Article 2's remedial
scheme by tearing assunder the concepts of non-conformity and breach
of warranty. The court treats non-conformity as a justification for
revocation of acceptance against Pierce without recognizing that
allowing revocation of acceptance implies that Pierce was a breaching
seller which runs counter to the jury's explicit findings. Allowing
revocation of acceptance against a party not in breach is inconsistent
with Article 2's remedial scheme as a whole and is specifically contrary
to the Code's concept of non-conformity.
To clarify my argument, it is necessary to explore several Code
definitions. "Contract" is defined in section 1-201(11): "[Tlhe total
legal obligation which results from the parties' agreement as affected by
this Act and any other applicable rules of law." 145 The total legal
obligation of a seller is greatly affected by warranties imposed by the
Act. 14 6 A seller's total legal obligation includes warranty obligations,
express or implied or both.147 While drawing a distinction between
breach of warranty and breach of contract may on occasion be useful, it
is unnecessary under the foregoing definition because "contract" under
the Code includes warranty obligations.
Against the Code's concept of "contract," I will examine the Code's
concept of "non-conformity." "Non-conformity" under Article 2 is
defined by implication from the definition of "conforming" set forth in
section 2-106(2) which states: "Goods or conduct including any part of

144. Since Pierce had paid off Metropolitan Savings and Loan and had taken title to the mobile
home, there exists a question of whether or not the revesting of title contemplated by section 2-401(4)
in Schult would have made any sense on the facts. If either Pierce or Schult had an unjust enrichment
claim, one against the other, they could have asked the court to resolve the claim under non-Code law
which enters via section 1-103.
145. U.C.C. § 1-201 (11) (1989).
146. Id. §§ 2-313, -314, -315.
147. Id. §§ 2-312 to -315.
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a performance are 'conforming' or conform to the contract when they
are in accordance with the obligations under the contract. "148
It follows that non-conforming goods or conduct consists of goods
or conduct not in accordance with obligations under the contract.
Therefore, non-conforming goods are ipso facto at variance with the
seller's contract obligations, and the variation is necessarily a breach of
contract. This does not imply negligence or deception or an intentional
breach. Breach of contract under Article 2 is no different from breach
of contract outside of Article 2, and breach of warranty is a breach of
contract. Warranty liability is a species of strict liability. 149 If one thing
is expressly or impliedly promised and another thing is tendered,
warranty liability arises from the fact of the variance between obligation
and performance.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Ford Motor Credit v.
Harperl1O aptly characterized breach of warranty as a "subset" of
non-conformity. 15 1 The court stated:
The concept of nonconformity "includes not only breaches of
warranties but also any failure of the seller to perform
according to his obligations under the contract." Ark. Stat.
Ann. 85-2-714, Comment 2. It is thus apparent that breach of
warranty and nonconformity are not entirely congruent
52
concepts; the former being a subset of the latter.1
That non-conformity constitutes a breach of contract is wellillustrated in Michiana Mack, Inc. v. Allendale Rural Fire Protection
District.153 Michiana Mack, Inc. (Michiana) sold a used fire truck to
Allendale Rural Fire Protection District (Allendale). 154 Allendale bought
the fire truck knowing of an overheating problem on the strength of
Michiana's promise that the problem would be solved. 155 It was not.
Allendale sued for damages. 156 The trial court found a non-conformity,
157
and therefore used section 2-714(1) as a guide for devising a remedy.

148. Id. § 2-106(2).
149. Contract liability is strict liability. The failure to perform a promise, as opposed to
intentional or negligent conduct at variance with accepted norms, establishes liability.
150. 671 F.2d 1117 (8th Cir. 1982).151. Ford Motor Credit v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117. 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Arkansas law).
152. Id.
153. 428 N.E.2d 1367 (Ind. App. 1981).
154. Michiana Mack, Inc. v. Allendale Rural Fire Protection Dis., 428 N.E.2d 1367, 1369 (Ind.
App. 1981).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. (applying U.C.C. § 2-714 (establishing a set of remedies "for any non-conformity of
tender")).
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The trial court rejected section 2-714(2) which establishes a measure of
damages for "breach of warranty."158
Finding the trial court's distinction between "non-conformity" and
"breach of warranty" untenable, the appellate court quoted Official
Comment 2 to section 2-714 which states in pertinent part: "[tlhe
'non-conformity' referred to... includes not only breaches of warranties
but also any failure of the seller to perform according to his obligations.
. .,;159 hence, the court recognized breach of warranty, as a subset of
non-conformity. The court explained more fully:
Therefore, "non-conformity" is a term of art used to describe
two broad categories of breaches, in goods or in conduct.
"Non-conformity" is not a separate remedy. This distinction,
however, does not negate the trial court's finding that there was
a breach of contract. In fact, Michiana does not dispute that
there was such a breach.
The trial court clearly found that the fire truck was "nonconforming." Under the facts of this case and the law of
warranties, such finding of the trial court was equivalent to
finding that a breach of warranty had occurred.16 0
In both Ford Motor Credit v. Harper and Michiana Mack, Inc. v.
Allendale Rural Fire Protection District the courts cited Official
Comment 2 under section 2-714 for persuasive authority in explicating
the meaning of "non-conformity." Section 41-02-93 of the North
Dakota Century Code is the same as section 2-714 of the Uniform
Commercial Code under which the cited comment appears. While the
Century Code does not include a reprint of the Official Comments, the
North Dakota Supreme Court has cited the Official Comments as
persuasive authority. 161 It is reasonable to conclude that in North
Dakota, as elsewhere, breach of warranty should be viewed as a subset of
non-conformity. Non-conformity means breach. Consequently, when
section 2-608 states that "[t]he buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot

158. Id. at 1371.
159. Michiana.428 N.E.2d at 1370 (quoting official Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-714).
160. Id. (emphasis added). Accord Esquire Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Arrendale, 356 S.E.2d 250,
252 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing Georgia's interpretation of non-conformity to be viewed as a
question of quality of goods and performance of the contractual obligations).
161. E.g. Welken v. Conley, 252 N.W.2d 311, 315-16 (N.D. 1977) (quoting the Official
Comment to section 2-608). Troutman v. Pierce, 402 N.W.2d 920, 923 (N.D. 1987) (quoting the
Official Comment to section 2-714). Moreover, the author is advised by Mr. John Walstad. Code
Revisor. North Dakota Legislative Council. that bills enacting the Code as positive law were prepared
for enactment and adopted without the comments according to customary legislative practice.
However, this does not imply that the Official Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code are
unavailable as persuasive authority.
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or commercial unit whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value
to him... ,162 the word "non-conformity" does not describe a condition
of the goods that can exist apart from some seller's liability for a breach.
"Non-conformity" is not neutral in terms of breach; it always means
163
there has been a breach by a seller in the chain of distribution.
This conclusion brings me to the nub of the matter. Does the text
of Article 2 reasonably allow revocation of acceptance against an
immediate seller because of a remote seller's breach? The answer is no;
nothing in Article 2 establishes vicarious liability for any remedies,
including goods-oriented remedies.1 64 It is true that section 2-608 does
not literally spell out the requirement that the seller against whom
revocation of acceptance is invoked must be a seller in breach.
Nonetheless, there is language in Part 7 of Article 2 (the remedial part of
Article 2) which strongly implies that any defendant against whom
remedies can be employed must be a party in breach. 165
Section 2-703 is the index of seller's remedies.1 66 The introductory
paragraph in section 2-703, which precedes the list of available remedies,
enumerates the breaches by a buyer which may trigger the applicability
of the remedies by an aggrieved seller. 167 Moreover, Official Comment
I to section 2-703 summarizes the purpose of the section: "This section
is an index section which gathers together in one convenient place all of
the various remedies open to a seller for any breach by the buyer."
The necessary nexus between breach and remedy is explicit. While
the Official Comment to section 2-711 (index of buyer's remedies) is not
quite so clear as the foregoing comment, the text of subsection (1)
contains an enumeration of seller's breaches which precedes the list of
buyer's remedies. 168 The seller against whom any remedy is employed is
presumed to be a seller in breach. Finally, in section 1-106(1) which sets
forth the Code's remedial philosophy, the rights of the aggrieved party

162. U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (1989).
163. To take the converse, goods sold "AS IS"are conforming even ifdefective so long as good
title is conveyed. Of course, even the warranty of good title can be disclaimed by specific language
under section 2-312(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code.
164. Perhaps an agent could make himself liable for an undisclosed principal under general
principles of agency law incorporated through section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Nobody in Troutman ever suggested that Pierce was liable as Schult's agent.
165. See U.C.C. §§ 2-703. -711 (1989).
166. Id. § 2-703, cmt. 1.
167. "Where the buyer wrongfully rejects or revokes acceptance of goods or fails to make a
payment due on or before delivery or repudiates with respect to a part or the whole . . . the aggrieved
seller
may...." U.C.C. § 2-703 (1989).
168. "Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects or
justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to any goods involved ... the buyer may cancel and
whether or not he has done so may inaddition to recovering so much of the price as has been paid..
." U.C.C. § 2-711(1) (1989).
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are set up against the "other party" who has not fully performed, the
breaching party.1 69 Thus, revocation of acceptance requires breach of
contract by the seller against whom this remedial device is used.
The North Dakota Supreme Court did justice in Troutman v. Pierce
by allowing Troutmans to recover against Schult through Pierce, but
doctrinally the basis for recovery runs afoul of the Code scheme by
imposing on Pierce an obligation not voluntarily assumed, and certainly
not imposed from the Code. Pierce delivered what it agreed to deliver
and, according to the jury, Pierce made no warranties. 17 0 Thus, the
mobile home (even if defective) conformed to the contract of sale
between Pierce and Troutmans. There could be no non-conformity in
the contract of sale between Troutmans and Pierce based on defects in
the mobile home once the jury decided that Pierce had made no
warranties respecting the quality of the mobile home. The jury having

169. Section 1-106(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the end that the
aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed
but neither consequential nor special nor penal damages may be had except as
specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law.

U.C.C. § 1-106 (1) (1989).
170. Troutman v. Pierce, 402 N.W.2d 920. 922 (N.D. 1987). Pierce probably made the warranty
of good title under section 2-312(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, but title was never in issue.
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established the facts exculpating Pierce, it strains the text of sections
1-106(1), 2-608, and 2-711(1) to the breaking point to find Pierce a
viable defendant for the remedies of revocation of acceptance and
refund. In my view, when the jury answered the special interrogatories
exculpating Pierce, Troutman's revocation of acceptance case collapsed,
since there had been no notice and no claim for revocation against
Schult.171 Under the Code scheme, Troutmans should have been limited
to damages against Schult under section 2-714(2) and section 2-715.172
This was the course taken by a federal appellate court in. Voytovich v.
Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. 173 in which the court denied revocation
against a remote seller but sustained the award for damages under
section 2-714(2). 174

171. There is authority which appears to run directly contrary to the view I am advocating. For
example, in Blankenship v. Northtown Ford, Inc., 420 N.E.2d 167 (III. App. Ct. 1981), the buyers
sought to revoke acceptance of a car on the basis of non-merchantability under section 2-314 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. The trial judge entered judgment in favor of the manufacturer but against
the dealer, thereby allowing buyers revocation and refund. Id. at 169. The dealer appealed, relying
on its disclaimer of all implied warranties. Id. The appellate court upheld the judgment for revocation
and refund on two grounds. First, the court concluded that the disclaimer did not meet the
requirements of section 2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code (despite the fact that buyers had
stipulated that it did). Id. at 170. Second, the appellate court concluded that due to the defects in the
car, "revocation of acceptance is appropriate even if the dealer has properly disclaimed all implied
warranties." Id. Thus, it would appear that the court disconnected revocation of acceptance from
breach and would allow revocation of acceptance in the absence of breach. A close reading,
however, shows that the court dwelt upon the dealer's representation that this was a "new car" and
thought that this carried with it minimum characteristics; hence, while the case was not so pled, it could
be understood as an express warranty case. In a short and delightful law review article, Manning G.
Warren III and Michelle Rowe, interpreted the opinion in Blankenship as justifying revocation of
acceptance for breach of an express warranty. See Manning G. Warren III & Michelle Rowe, The
Effect of Warranty Disclaimers on Revocation of Acceptance under the Uniform Commercial Code. 37
Ala. Law Rev. 307, 329 (1986). Warren and Rowe argue that lawyers for buyers should employ the
Code's expansive definition of contract (section 1-201 (11) of the Uniform Commercial Code) and the
expansive possibilities of express warranty (section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code) to find
'non conformities" to justify revocation of acceptance. While I think the article is true to the case law
and very insightful, I would urge that in many cases the better solution is to allow revocation of
acceptance and refund directly against the remote warrantor for reasons stated in this article. Finally,
in at least two cases purporting to follow Blankenship, there is loose language which, taken literally,
could allow revocation of acceptance without identifying any breach by any party. See Lytle v. Roto
Lincoln Mercury & Subaru, 521 N.E.2d 201, 208 (II1.App. Ct. 1988) and O'Neal Ford, Inc. v. Earley,
681 S.W.2d 414,416 (Ark. App. Ct. 1985). The implication that non-conformity can exist without any
breach of any seller's contract obligations is. in my view, plainly wrong.
172. While Troutmans had put in evidence of incidental and consequential damages under
section 2-715 of the Uniform Commercial Code, there was no evidence of the value differential at the
time of acceptance as required by section 2-714(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code; hence, the
sustainable award would have been minimal.
173. 494 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1974).
174. Voytovich v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 494 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1974) (applying Ohio
law).
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IV. THE PATHWAY TO SIMPLE JUSTICE
A.

AN ANALYTICALLY SOUND PATHWAY TO A JUST RESULT

It is possible under Article 2 to do justice to persons situated
similarly to the Troutmans without imposing a remedy on a nonbreaching party. The pathway to simple justice is to allow revocation of
acceptance and refund as remedies against non-privity sellers who
breach warranty obligations. In Troutman, assuming this principle had
been established, plaintiffs' counsel could have sent the notice of
revocation to both Pierce and Schult and could have pled for the
remedies of revocation and refund against Pierce and Schult. When the
jury decided for Pierce and against Schult, revocation and refund could
have been enforced directly against Schult. Incidental and consequential
damages could have been awarded against Schult directly. Excepting its
claim for indemnity for attorney's fees and costs, Pierce could have been
dismissed.
By suggesting that the best path is to abolish the privity requirement
for revocation of acceptance, I am advocating for the minority
position.17 5 Naturally, there are many objections to this viewpoint. I
suggest, however, that two common text-based objections to revocation
of acceptance without privity are unsound. I will call these objections (i)
the linguistic trap and (ii) the conceptual trap. I contend that it is
possible to avoid both traps while remaining faithful to the language of
the Article 2.
The linguistic trap is an unnecessarily restricted reading of the term
"seller." Under Article 2, "'seller' means a person who sells or contracts
to sell goods." 17 6 "A 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller
to the buyer for a price."17 7 Since Schult did not pass title to Troutmans
for a price, critics will argue that Schult was not a "seller" within Article
2's definition, at least in relation to Troutmans, and therefore could not
be a proper defendant in a revocation of acceptance case because section
2-608 contemplates revocation against the "seller." The problem with
this line of thinking is two-fold: first, Schult did pass title to Pierce for a
price and is a "seller" in the distribution chain; second, a majority of
courts allows suits for damages under section 2-313 against non-privity
sellers for breach of express warranties. 17 8 A minority of courts allows

175. See supra note 20 (citing minority-view and majority-view cases).
176. U.C.C. § 2-103 (1989).
177. Id. § 2-106(1).
178. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 11-7.
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consumers recovery of economic loss under section 2-314 against
non-privity merchant-sellers for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability.1 79 Under either section 2-313 or section 2-314, only a
seller can be liable for breach of warranty. Thus, in practice and
common parlance, "seller" means more than immediate seller. 18 0
Restricting the meaning of "seller" to immediate seller in section
2-608 cases and allowing "seller" to include remote sellers in section
2-313181 or section 2-314182 cases in which only damages are sought is
manipulating the term "seller" simply to gain the desired result. The
meaning of "seller" should not turn on whether the plaintiff asks for a
goods-oriented remedy or merely for a damages remedy. This does not
prove, of course, that "seller" in section 2-608 should embrace remote
sellers; it simply establishes the Code's open-endedness or linguistic
neutrality in ascribing a meaning to the term "seller" and opens the door
for including non-privity sellers within the definition of "seller."
With this broader meaning of "seller" in mind, section 2-608 can be
read more liberally. For example, regarding the notice of revocation,
section 2-608 states: "It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller
of it."183 Granting that in the garden variety case, this will mean notice to
the immediate seller, there is no sound textual reason why this could not
also mean notice to a breaching, remote seller. Likewise, section
4-401(4)'s statement that "justified revocation of acceptance revests title
to goods in the seller" does not need to be restricted to the immediate
seller. Title can revest in a remote seller against whom the remedy is
employed. Thus, the linguistic trap is avoidable, without forfeiting
integrity in interpreting the text.
There is also a conceptual trap, namely, the equating of revocation
of acceptance and refund with pre-Code rescission and restitution. This
is most perfectly illustrated in Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co. 184
decided by the Virgnia Supreme Court. The theory used by the court in
denying revocation of acceptance against the remote seller was that
revocation meant cancelling the contract (rescission) and re-establishing
the status quo ante (restitution); hence, revocation of acceptance was
deemed inappropriate.1 8 5 Of course, there was no contract of sale

179. Id. § 11-5.
180. In the most recent draft of Revised Article 2. "seller" is defined in section 2-318 (a) & (c) to
include remote sellers. See infra Appendix 3 (containing the draft text of U.C.C. § 2-318).
181. Express warranty cases.
182. Implied warranty of merchantability cases.
183. U.C.C. § 2-608(2) (1989).
184. 313 S.E.2d 384 (Va. 1984).
185. Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co., 313 S.E.2d 384, 389-90 (Va. 1984).
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between the remote seller and the buyer.18 6 Since there was no contract
for sale, there was in the court's view, nothing to rescind; moreover, a
forced exchange between a buyer and a distant seller would not have
re-established the status quo ante. 187 Instead, a forced exchange between
the complaining buyer and a remote seller would have by-passed the
immediate seller whose position must change to re-establish the status
quo ante.
The short answer is that revocation of acceptance and refund under
the Code's remedial scheme are not merely new terms for rescission and
restitution. Section 2-608, Official Comment 1 states:
The section no longer speaks of "rescission," a term capable of
ambiguous application either to transfer of title to the goods or
to the contract of sale and susceptible also of confusion with
cancellation for cause of an executory or executed portion of
the contract. The remedy under this section is instead referred
to simply as "revocation of acceptance" of goods tendered

under a contract for sale ....

188

Revocation of acceptance is a legal act whereby a buyer elects to
reverse the acceptance which occurred pursuant to section 2-606 and
seeks to revest title in a seller189 in order to pave the way for refund and
other remedies, as appropriate under the facts of the case. The
underlying sales contract is not automatically cancelled, though the
buyer may elect to cancel. 190 I argued earlier that there is no reason why
the revesting of title cannot be a revesting in a remote seller in the
distribution chain. Likewise, there is no reason why the reversal of
acceptance must be tied to the immediate seller who tendered the goods.
This will commonly be the case, but voiding a section 2-606 acceptance
is not of necessity a legal act requiring the re-establishment of the status
quo ante between buyer and immediate seller. Just as a buyer can seek
damages in many cases against a remote warrantor, so also a buyer
should be able to say in effect to a remote, breaching seller: "I don't
want these goods anymore, I want my money back, and you can do with
the goods as you please."

186.
187.
188.
189.
(1989).
190.

Id. at 387.
Id. at 390.
U.C.C. § 2-608 cmt. 1 (1989).
The revesting happens automatically when the revocation is justified. U.C.C. § 2-401(4)
See U.C.C. § 2-711(1) (1989). See also U.C.C. § 2-106(4) (defining "cancellation").
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The practical purpose of the Code's remedial scheme is to meet the
expectations generated by the parties' contract. 19 1 If a forced exchange
between a buyer and a remote seller meets this remedial goal better than
any other remedial device in any given situation, it makes sense to allow
it. Hence, the insistence on privity for the application of section 2-608
in tandem with section 2-711(1) runs contrary to the remedial purpose
of section 1-106(1). The conceptual trap of equating revocation and
refund with rescission and restitution has cramped the courts in
interpreting the Code and has thereby thwarted the Code's remedial
objective. The trap is avoidable by focusing on section 2-608 as a
remedial device designed to operate with other buyer's remedies to
protect a buyer's reasonable expectations generated by the sales
contract.

B.

192

THE CASE FOR CLARIFICATION OF SECTION
AMENDMENT

2-608

BY

The argument made in the foregoing pages is simply an argument
that lawyers should advocate and judges should choose the minority view
(revocation of acceptance without privity) over the majority view (privity
required) when circumstances make this choice sensible in order to
achieve the Code's remedial objective. Given the split in jurisdictions,
however, as well as the split in the commentaries, a clarification in the
revision of Article 2 would be most welcome. The revision is well
underway with Professor Speidel of Northwestern School of Law serving
as Reporter to the Revision Committee. 193
In the most recent revised draft, the Revision Committee used
language which would be helpful in solving the privity problem which
has arisen under section 2-608. The proposed text of section 2-318 is
attached as Appendix 3.194 In a nutshell, the draft would extend express
and implied warranties made to an immediate buyer to any remote buyer
who may reasonably be expected to buy, use or be affected by the goods
and who suffers damages from breach of the warranty. The rights of
consumer buyers and buyers to whom an express warranty runs would
include the goods-oriented remedies of rejection and revocation of

191. See U.C.C. § 1-106(l) (stating the purpose of the Code's remedial scheme).
192. See U.C.C. § 1-201(11) (defining "contract" as the totality of legal obligations created).
193. Professor Robert T. Nimmer, University of Houston, Law Center, is Reporter for
Technology issues.
194. See infra Appendix 3. Copyright 1994 by the American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Reprinted with permission of the Permanent
Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code.
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acceptance against remote sellers. 195 Adoption of this version of Revised
Article 2, or some variation thereof, would lift the fog that now hovers
over section 2-608 in cases where the remote seller breaches an express
warranty or the implied warranty of merchantability and the immediate
seller does not. A direct action for rejection or revocation of acceptance
and refund of the price would be allowed. 196 If such seller within a
reasonable time either refunded the price, or cured by tendering
19 7
conforming goods, then no consequential damages would be allowed.
The foregoing proposal, or some variation thereof, deserves support
as a means of reducing the confusion surrounding the use of section
2-608.198 It would make section 2-608 a viable remedy without
inflicting injustice on a non-liable intermediate seller by holding that
seller in a suit as a conduit for the use of section 2-608.199 However, for

195. See U.C.C. § 2-318(d)(1) (1989).
196. Because the criteria for rejection (section 2-601) and revocation of acceptance (section
2-608) are quite different, I am limiting my argument to revocation of acceptance. The 1994 Draft of
Revised Article 2 would break down the privity requirement for both revocation of acceptance and
rejection.
197. See infra Appendix 3 (containing reproduction of the 1994 Draft of Revised Article 2, §
2-318(d)(2)).
198. 1 put the question of whether or not revocation of acceptance without privity should be
allowed to the counsel in the Troutman case. Mr. McKechnie thought revocation of acceptance
without privity definitely should be allowed when the retailer is merely a conduit for a manufacturer's
warranties. Mr. Brakke was equivocal and expressed some philosophical reservations about this
approach. Mr. Peterson thought revocation of acceptance in the absence of privity should not be
allowed which is, of course, the position taken by the majority of judges who have considered the
question to date under the current version of Article 2. While my position parallels that of Mr.
McKechnie, I think these responses are very interesting because they seem to reflect the roles each
played in the case tried almost ten years ago.
199. Any proposal allowing revocation of acceptance without privity will be subject to criticisms,
some well-reasoned and some not. The following hypothetical poses a problem which might occur if
section 2-318 is amended in accordance with the proposal set forth in Appendix 3. Suppose Eric, the
buyer in the introduction to this artcle, bought a snowmobile from a dealer on credit, took delivery, and
failed to reject within a reasonable time; hence, before paying any money, Eric made a legal
acceptance of the snowmobile. See U.C.C. § 2-606 (1989). The dealer successfully disclaimed
implied warranties and made no express warranties whatever to Eric. but did pass on the
manufacturer's express warranty. Suppose further that the dealer paid the manufacturer when he
purchased the snowmobile for resale. Now. if Eric discovers a non-conformity that substantially
impairs the value of the snowmobile to him and gives timely notice of revocation of acceptance
(section 2-608) to the manufacturer based on breach of the express earranty, Eric may have a claim
to incidental damages (section 2-715(1)), or even to cover or its contract-market alternative (sections
2-712 and 2-713), but Eric has no claim to a refund since he has not paid anything. But what about the
dealer who breached no obligations to Eric since no warranties of quality were made? Can Eric
assert the remedy of cancellation against the non-breaching dealer, or in any event refuse payment
because of the remote seller's breach? I contend that Eric should be able to cancel against the nonbreaching dealer (immediate seller) because of the breach of the remote seller. Otherwise. Eric must
pay for something which he does not keep and seek recovery in a roundabout way from the remote
seller. Thus, Eric could use the remote seller's breach as a defense against a claim for payment made
by the dealer (immediate seller). This is analogous to allowing a consumer buyer to assert a defense
arising from breach of warranty by a seller against a subsequent holder of commercial paper. See 16
C.F.R. § 433. While this would force the non-breaching immediate seller to seek a remedy from his
upstream seller, and to that extent imposes a burden, and possibly an economic harm on the non
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maximum clarification, either the text of section 2-608, or at minimum,
the Official Comments, should be amended to specifically authorize
revocation of acceptance in appropriate cases against a remote seller. It
might additionally be desirable to consider re-naming section 2-608.
Since acceptance is made after tender by an immediate seller to buyer,
the term revocation of acceptance in many minds connotes a legal effect
which can only involve the buyer and immediate seller. If the section
were, for example, called "Return of Goods and Refund After Acceptance" it might be more easily employed against remote sellers. Thus,
the linguistic and conceptual traps might be more easily avoided.
V.

CONCLUSION

The title to this article implies a question: What is the cost of
outrunning the law to do justice? I thereby tried to suggest that in
Troutman v. Pierce the trial court and the North Dakota Supreme Court
outran the law by using Pierce, the immediate seller, merely as a conduit,
to foist liability onto the responsible party, namely, Schult, without any
Code-based justification for doing so. The cost paid for this effort to
accomplish justice was to hold Pierce, a defendant exculpated completely
by the jury, liable for a substantial judgment, while allowing indemnity
over against Schult.
For reasons set forth earlier, the cost of achieving justice for
Troutmans in this circuitous manner was a slight injustice to Pierce and
the sowing of some very bad jurisprudential seed. By allowing
revocation of acceptance against a non-liable party, the North Dakota
Supreme Court may have improyidently set the law on a course which
could unnecessarily harm innocent intermediate sellers, and which would
not provide sufficient remedial relief against remote sellers where
intermediate sellers are dissolved or beyond the court's jurisdiction.
Moreover, this course seems to conflict with the result reached in Erling
v. Homera, Inc.20 0 While the distant observer must.,admire the court's
creative attempt to do justice in accord with the jury verdict, the
analytically better path is to allow revocation of acceptance and refund
without privity, either by judicial grafting or statutory clarification.

breaching immediate seller, it is preferable to denying the buyer the right to revocation of acceptance
if it best protects his expectation interest.
200. 298 N.W.2d 478 (N.D. 1980).

844

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 70:4

APPENDIX 1
(Letter of Revocation)

TO: PIERCE, Inc. (Williston lot)
3801 West Main Street
Fargo, ND 58102
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Section 41-02-71 of the
North Dakota Century Code, the undersigned hereby revoke the prior
acceptance of the 1982 14 x 68 Schult Citation (Serial Number 182673)
delivered in March of 1982 pursuant to our undated agreement, a copy
of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof.
The mobile home described above is defective in the following
manner:
The outside walls were installed incorrectly and do not prevent rain
from seeping through the insulation and settling on the floors of the
inside living area. The water seepage has already necessitated the
replacement of the lower half of our inside walls on one occasion. The
steps taken to date to prevent the water from coming through the outside
walls have failed.
The mobile home was accepted without our knowledge or ability to
determine that it was defective in this manner.
The defect was of such a nature that its existence could only be
determined through exposure to bad weather. Once the existence of the
defect became known, we made demands that it be corrected which has
not been done to date.
The non-conformity of the mobile home is of such a nature that is
substantially impairs the value of it to us. We therefore exercise our
right to revoke our acceptance of the mobile home awaiting your
instructions as to its disposition.
Dated: September 22, 1983.
/s/ Edward J. Troutman
/s/ Debra K. Troutman
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APPENDIX 2
Verdict Form with Special Interrogatories
(Caption omitted)

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury:
You are instructed that under the theory of recovery alleged by the
plaintiffs in this case you are to answer the following questions:
1.

Do you find that the defendant Schult Home Corporation

extended an express warranty to the plaintiffs?

X

ANSWER:

Yes

No

2. Do you find that the defendant Pierce, Inc. extended an express
warranty to the plaintiffs?
ANSWER:

Yes

_

X

No

3. Do you find that the defendant Schult Home Corporation
extended an implied warranty of merchantability to the plaintiffs?
ANSWER:

X

Yes

No

4. Do you find that the defendant Pierce, Inc. extended an implied
warranty of merchantability to the plaintiffs?
ANSWER:

Yes

X

No

(NOTE: If your answer to all four of the above questions is "No,"
please notify the bailiff and return the verdict form to the Court for
further proceedings.)
5. Do you find that the Schult mobile home was substantially
defective?
ANSWER: _X_ Yes

__

No
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6. Do you find that the defendant Schult Home Corporation was
given reasonable notice of any defects in the mobile home?
ANSWER:

X

Yes

No

7. Do you find that the defendant Pierce, Inc. was given reasonable
notice of any defects in the mobile home?
ANSWER:

X

Yes

No

8. Do you find that the defendant Schult Home Corporation was
given a reasonable opportunity to remedy any defects in the mobile
home?
ANSWER:

X

Yes

__

_

No

9. Do you find that the defendant Pierce, Inc. was given a
reasonable opportunity to remedy any defects in the mobile home?
ANSWER:

X

Yes

No

(Note: If your answer to Questions 6, 7, 8 and 9 are all "No", return
the verdict form to the bailiff.)
10. Are there any substantial defects in the subject mobile home
not remedied which were the responsibility of the defendant, Pierce,
Inc.?
ANSWER:

Yes

X_ No

(NOTE: If your answer to Question Number 10 is "No", do not
answer any further questions that relate to the defendant Pierce, Inc.)
10(a). Are there any substantial defects in the subject mobile home
not remedied which were the responsibility of the defendant Schult
Home Corporation?
ANSWER:

X

Yes

No

(Note: If your answer to Question Number 10(a) is "No", do not
answer any further questions that relate to the defendant Schult Home
Corporation.)
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11. Did any defects which are the responsibility of defendant
Schult Home Corporation in the mobile home which were not remedied
constitute a breach of any express warranty extended by Schult Home
Corporation?
ANSWER:

X

Yes

No

12. Did any defects which are the responsibility of the defendant
Pierce, Inc. in the mobile home which were not remedied constitute a
breach of any express warranty extended by Pierce, Inc.?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

13. Did any defects which were the responsibility of the defendant
Schult Home Corporation in the mobile home which were not remedied
constitute a breach of any implied warranty of merchantability extended
by Schult Home Corporation?
ANSWER:

X

Yes

No

14. Did any defects which were the responsibility of the defendant
Pierce, Inc. in the mobile home which were not remedied constitute a
breach of any implied warranty of merchantability extended by Pierce,
Inc.?
ANSWER:

__

Yes

No

15. Did any defects in the mobile home which were not remedied
substantially impair the value of the mobile home to the Troutmans?
ANSWER: _X_ Yes

-

No

16. What monies do you find the Troutmans paid on the purchase
of their mobile home?
$6591
17. What incidental and consequential damages, if any, do you find
that the Troutmans sustained as a consequence of any defect in their
mobile home which was not remedied?
$7000
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18. What is the reasonable use value, if any, received by plaintiffs in
connection with their occupancy of the Schult mobile home?

$o
19. If damages are awarded to the plaintiffs, do you award interest?
ANSWER:

X

Yes

No

If so, at what rate? (Not to exceed 6%)
6%

Dated at Minot, North Dakota, this 22 day of November, 1985.
Is/ Michael Leary
FOREMAN
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APPENDIX 3
DRAFT DISCUSSED AT THE MEETING OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
JULY 29 - AUGUST 5, 1994.

SECTION 2-318. EXTENSION OF EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
WARRANTIES.*
(a) A seller's express or implied warranty, made, to an immediate
buyer, extends to any person who may reasonably be expected to buy,
use, or be affected by the goods and who is damaged by breach of the
warranty. In this section, "seller" includes a manufacturer, "goods"
includes a component incorporated in substantially the same condition
into other goods, and "protected person" means a person to whom a
warranty extends under subsection (a).
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), the rights and
remedies of a protected person against a seller for breach of warranty
extended under subsection (a) are determined by the enforceable terms
of the contract between the seller and the immediate buyer and this
article.
(c) A buyer's rights and remedies for breach of a warranty are
determined under this article, as modified by subsection (d), without
regard to privity of contract or the terms of the contract between the
seller and the immediate buyer if:
(1) the buyer is a consumer to whom a warranty was extended
under subsection (a) and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act applies or
the seller is a merchant under Section 2-314(a) who sold unmerchantable goods; or
(2) the buyer is a member of the public to whom an express
warranty was made by the seller under Section 2-313 (c) or (d).
(d) A buyer under subsection (c) has all of the rights and remedies
against a remote seller provided by this article, except as follows:
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(1) To reject or revoke acceptance, notice must be given to the
remote seller within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should
have discovered the breach of warranty.
(2) Upon receipt of a timely notice of rejection or revocation of
acceptance, the remote seller has a reasonable time either to refund the
price paid by the buyer to the immediate seller or cure the breach by
supplying goods that conform to the warranty. If the seller complies
with this paragraph, the remote buyer has no further remedy against the
seller, except for incidental damages under Section 2-715(a). If the
remote seller fails to comply with this subsection, the buyer may claim
damages for breach of warranty, including consequential damages under
Section 2-715(b).
(3) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a buyer has no right to
consequential damages unless expressly agreed with the remote seller.
(4) A [claim for relief] for breach of warranty extended under
subsection (a) or created under Section 2-313(a)(3) accrues no earlier
than the time the remote buyer discovered or should have discovered the
breach.
(e) A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.

*Copyright 1994 by the American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Reprinted with
permission of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code.

